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IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S  
APPOINTMENT POWER 
PETER E. QUINT∗ 
I.  THE APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES 
When Robert Bork died recently, the obituaries focused primarily on 
the Senate’s rejection of his nomination to become an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court.1  Although there may have been several grounds for the 
negative votes of individual Senators, certainly many of those who voted 
against Bork were animated by their disagreement with positions that they 
assumed Bork would take in deciding cases in the Court.2  Prominent 
among these positions was Bork’s rejection of capacious rights of privacy 
and equality, which Bork viewed as illegitimate products of judicial 
construction, as well as Bork’s narrow view of the freedom of expression, a 
position that he had advanced in a well-known law review article.3  In 1963, 
Bork also published an article criticizing the public accommodations 
section of the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1964—on the grounds that it 
might interfere with the liberty of some discriminators—a view that he later 
sought to characterize as a thought experiment.4 
Commentators, then as now, asserted that rejections of Supreme Court 
nominees on such “ideological” or “political” grounds were rare or 
unprecedented in the Supreme Court’s history, and some claimed or implied 
that rejection of a judicial candidate by the Senate on such grounds was 
improper or at least unwise.  According to this view, the Senate should 
generally “consent” to a President’s judicial nomination unless there are 
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 1.  See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, A Conservative Whose Supreme Court Bid Set the Senate Afire, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2012, at A1.  
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 
20–35 (1971). 
 4.  Robert Bork, Civil Rights—A Challenge, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21; Bronner, 
supra note 1.  
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“neutral” disqualifying factors such as the nominee’s lack of judicial ability 
or past financial or other improprieties.5 
Yet whatever history may tell us about the frequency or infrequency of 
opposition to judicial nominees based on “political” or “ideological” 
reasons,6 it seems clear—as several eminent commentators have pointed 
out—that there is no argument of substance against the propriety of 
senatorial opposition based on such grounds.7  In the choice of members of 
the federal judiciary, including Supreme Court Justices, the President and 
the Senate must act as collaborators.  According to the constitutional text, 
the Senate should give the President “advice”8—that is, the Senate (or 
certain chosen members) should give the President an idea of the persons 
(or kinds of persons) who would be particularly acceptable to the Senate.9  
The President then makes the appointment subject to the approval—the 
“consent”—of the Senate.10  There is certainly nothing in the text that 
suggests that either the President or the Senate should ultimately play the 
superior role in this process, as both must approve the choice.  Moreover, 
there is no argument on principle for such a view.  The President and the 
Senate are collaborating in the choice of a member of the third branch.  
That branch may obviously have an impact on the work of both the 
President and the Senate in the future, but it is an independent branch not 
                                                          
 5.  See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, Save the Court from What?, 99 HARV L. REV. 1347 (1986) 
(reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985)) (arguing that the 
Senate should not employ “political considerations” in the judicial confirmation process); see also 
Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 2916 (1987) (statement of Professor 
Paul M. Bator) (arguing that the Senate should adopt “a heavy presumption in favor of the 
President’s nominee if that person possesses outstanding professional, intellectual and moral 
qualifications for the office of Supreme Court Justice”). 
 6.  For varying views on this history, compare LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS 
HONORABLE COURT 79–80, 86–92 (1985) (citing examples of Supreme Court nominees rejected 
by the Senate because of their “political, judicial, and economic philosophies”), with David J. 
Danelski, Ideology as a Ground for the Rejection of the Bork Nomination, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 900 
(1990) (seeking to cast doubt on several of Tribe’s historical examples); see also Paul A. Freund, 
Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1988). 
 7.  See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court 
Nominees, 79 YALE L. J. 657, 660 (1970) (arguing that Senators should take into account the 
“policy orientations” of judicial nominees); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: 
Law or Politics? 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1207 (1988) (declaring that the Senate may reject a 
Supreme Court nominee “on the basis of statesmanship, prudence, common sense, and politics”). 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 9.  TRIBE, supra note 6, at 80–81. 
 10.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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within the actual purview of either of the departments that are collaborating 
in the choice.11 
President Reagan’s nomination of Robert Bork was clearly a 
provocation.12  It seems undeniable that Reagan chose this radical jurist for 
precisely the same reasons of “ideology” and “politics” that (in reverse) 
galvanized the enraged senatorial opposition.  Reagan could well have 
chosen a more moderate candidate—as indeed he ultimately did in 
nominating Judge Anthony Kennedy after the failure of Bork’s 
nomination.13  Given the President’s choice of Bork for ideological and 
political reasons, there is no substantial argument that the Senate is in any 
way disabled from employing precisely the same sorts of criteria in 
accepting or rejecting the nomination.14 
The real problem for the Senate in such cases is an intensely practical 
one.  In making the initial decision, the President has the advantage of a 
certain amount of secrecy: the President does not have to elaborate at length 
on the ideological or political reasons that animated the nomination.  As 
Reagan did in announcing Bork’s nomination, the President can fall back 
on anodyne pronouncements praising the nominee’s qualifications.  Thus 
Reagan noted his “deep respect for [Bork’s] extraordinary abilities,” and he 
asserted that “Judge Bork is recognized as a premier constitutional 
authority” whose work reflects his “outstanding intellect and unrivaled 
scholarly credentials.”15  Moreover, “[o]n the bench, he has been well 
prepared, evenhanded, and openminded.”16  Only in remarking that Judge 
Bork was “widely regarded as the most prominent and intellectually 
powerful advocate of judicial restraint” did President Reagan even allude to 
what were certainly the animating reasons for his choice of Bork.17 
                                                          
 11.  Rachel Brand, Judicial Appointments: Checks and Balances in Practice, 33 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 47, 52 (2010); Black, supra note 7, at 660. 
 12.  Monaghan, supra note 7, at 1209. 
 13.  Before settling on Kennedy, President Reagan nominated Douglas H. Ginsburg, a federal 
appeals court judge and a former Harvard Law School professor, whose nomination was swiftly 
withdrawn after it became known that he had smoked marijuana.  Bronner, supra note 1. 
 14.  Black, supra note 7, at 660. 
 15.  Ronald Reagan, Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1 PUB. PAPERS 736 (Jul. 1, 1987). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id.  In a bitter statement issued after the failure of Bork’s nomination, President Reagan 
tipped his hand a bit more openly.  After criticizing the Senate for descending into politics and 
distorting the confirmation process, President Reagan declared that his next nominee “will share 
Judge Bork’s belief in judicial restraint . . . . He or she will share my belief that the courts of law 
must administer fair and firm justice to criminals and must show compassion to the victims of 
crime.  I will seek a nominee who understands the dangers of judicial license and leniency in the 
courtroom.”  Ronald Reagan, Statement on the Failure of the Senate to Confirm the Supreme 
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In contrast with the President’s opportunity to preserve a pose of 
statesmanlike demeanor, the opponents in the Senate must necessarily 
expose the “ideological” and “political” nature of their opposition in the 
hearings and debates.  Thus, the President may seem neutral and 
statesmanlike and the Senate may seem to have descended into the morass 
of politics—whereas, in reality, the considerations on both sides are likely 
to have been of precisely the same nature. 
One might argue that vigorous Senate opposition may injure the 
judiciary by making it difficult to confirm any judges.  But this is not an 
argument for presidential supremacy in this process.  Rather, it is an 
argument for presidential accommodation to some extent of the wishes of 
the Senate—as indeed ultimately did occur in the President’s appointment 
of Kennedy. 
So I would conclude that it is completely appropriate for members of 
the Senate to consider their approval or disapproval of what they think will 
be the judicial opinions of a nominee in deciding whether that nominee 
should be confirmed.  The President has taken this “ideological” aspect into 
account and so may the Senate. 
II. THE APPOINTMENT OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICERS 
As many commentators (and Senators) agree, the situation is at least 
somewhat different with respect to appointments of executive branch 
officers.18  In these cases, the President is appointing members of the 
executive branch itself.  Those officers will assist the President in “tak[ing] 
care that the laws be faithfully executed”19 and in carrying out whatever 
direct powers the President may appropriately exercise under Article II.  In 
most instances, the President has been elected by the people, and the 
candidate of the opposition party has been defeated.  These results give 
significant democratic legitimacy to the President’s decisions on how the 
Executive’s constitutional and statutory discretion should be exercised; 
moreover, the President often “receives the credit or blame” for the 
performance of the executive branch.20  Thus, many Senators are willing to 
                                                          
Court Nomination of Robert H. Bork, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1230 (Oct. 23, 1987).  Thus Reagan pretty 
clearly implied that he sought Supreme Court Justices who would seek to undo (or at least qualify) 
important aspects of the Warren Court legacy.  President Reagan made similar statements on 
several occasions during the course of the Bork Controversy.  See, e.g., Remarks at a White House 
Briefing on Proposed Criminal Justice Reform Legislation, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1192, 1194 (Oct. 16, 
1987). 
 18.  Black, supra note 7, at 659–60. 
 19.  U.S. CONST. art. II § 3. 
 20.  Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers Without 
a Senate Confirmation Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940, 948 (2013).  
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accord some degree of deference to the President’s choice of the executive 
personnel who would best implement the President’s views.  This certainly 
does not mean that the Senate is obligated to accept, without scrutiny, any 
nominee proposed by the President.  But it does indicate—I believe—that a 
certain amount of extra weight should be accorded to the fact that the 
President has chosen a particular individual to assist in implementing the 
President’s discretion on general goals and specific policy.  The result is 
that Senators might appropriately accord a degree of deference to executive 
branch appointments by the President—a deference which, as shown above, 
is by no means obligatory in the case of the President’s nominations to the 
federal judiciary.21 
This view also suggests that, in the case of presidential appointments 
of executive officers, the use of procedural devices in the Senate to avoid a 
senatorial vote of approval or disapproval is particularly inconsistent with 
constitutional implications of the President’s appointment power.22  If a 
President’s nominee for an executive position is voted down in the Senate, 
the structural value of having consistency in the executive branch, 
according to the President’s views, meets the counterpoise of certain 
democratic values in the Senate’s vote.  But if the nominee is blocked by 
the minority’s use of a filibuster or other device, the Senate’s democratic 
values fall away as a counterpoise to the structural value of having the 
President choose his or her colleagues in the executive branch.  Thus, the 
use of the filibuster against executive branch nominees seems less 
legitimate than its use in the case of legislation, in which the structure of the 
system provides no particular justification for or against any proposed 
statute. 
III.  THE NOEL CANNING CASE 
Up to this point, the discussion on judicial and executive appointments 
has remained in the realm of what might be called “constitutional 
morality”—that is, thoughts on how members of the Senate should act, or 
                                                          
 21.  Some observers advance a more absolutist version of this position, according almost 
complete deference to the President’s choice of executive branch officers.  Charles Black, for 
example, declares: “[T]here is a clear structural reason for a Senator’s letting the President have 
pretty much anybody he wants [in an executive office], and certainly for letting him have people 
of any political views that appeal to him.”  Black, supra note 7, at 660.  In my opinion, however, 
this view goes too far.  Structural considerations justify a degree of deference in this area, but a 
Senator must remain free to oppose executive branch nominees whose views lead the Senator to 
believe that the nominee’s presence in the executive branch would be damaging to important 
values. 
 22.  See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 20, at 949 (condemning the use of procedural devices in 
the Senate to block the appointment of senior executive branch officials). 
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might appropriately act, in voting on presidential appointments. But, up to 
this point, the discussion has not implicated the kind of “constitutional law” 
that can be enforced by courts. 
Yet, a recent decision concerning recess appointments to the National 
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), Noel Canning v. NLRB,23 suggests that, 
in some areas, these principles may also have a bearing on judicial review. 
The background story of Noel Canning begins with the efforts of 
Republican Senators to employ procedural devices for the purpose of 
preventing a Senate confirmation vote on one or more prospective members 
of the NLRB nominated by President Obama.24  These obstructive measures 
may have represented opposition to the policies that these Senators thought 
the nominees might pursue on the Board, or the measures may have 
reflected hostility toward the entire purpose and effect of the National 
Labor Relations Act.  At approximately the same time, Republican Senators 
employed procedural devices (a form of filibuster) to prevent a vote by the 
Senate on the appointment of Richard Cordray, a former Attorney General 
of Ohio, as Director of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
established by the Dodd-Frank Act.25  The motivation here was pretty 
clearly to achieve the de facto “repeal” of portions of the legislation 
establishing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, by refusing to 
permit an effective Director to be appointed.26 
Against the background of these attempts to impede the President’s 
authority over the execution of federal law—and, it may well be to impede 
the federal law itself—President Obama appointed three members of the 
                                                          
 23.  705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013). 
 24.  See Stephenson, supra note 20, at 943 (noting that the “Senate minority refused to allow 
a confirmation vote” on nominees for the NLRB). 
 25.  John H. Cushman, Jr., Senate Stops Consumer Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, at 
B1. 
 26.  Id.  This issue was particularly important because significant authority under the Dodd-
Frank Act, such as the power to regulate “nonbank” financial companies, may only be exercised if 
the Bureau has a Director.  See Alexander M. Wolf, Note, Taking Back What’s Theirs: The Recess 
Appointments Clause, Pro Forma Sessions, and a Political Tug-of-War, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2055, 2057, 2060–61 (2013); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Op-Ed., Games and Gimmicks in the 
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012, at A25 (noting that the Bureau “cannot legally exercise its full 
statutory authority . . . without a director”).  According to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, this 
was “‘the first time in Senate history [that] a party blocked a qualified nominee solely because it 
disagrees with the existence of an agency that was created by law, through a bipartisan vote.’”  
Cushman, supra note 25.  In a remarkable retrospective statement, one Republican senator 
candidly acknowledged the Republicans’ motives for these maneuvers: “‘Cordray was being 
filibustered because we don’t like the law’ that created the consumer agency, said Senator Lindsey 
Graham, Republican of South Carolina.  ‘That’s not a reason to deny someone their appointment.  
We were wrong.’”  Jonathan Weisman and Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate Strikes Filibuster Deal, 
Ending Logjam on Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2013, at A1. 
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NLRB by what he considered to be a “recess appointment” under Article II, 
Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution.27  This provision authorizes the 
President to fill a vacancy “that may happen during the recess of the 
Senate.”28  Such an appointment lasts only until “the end of [the Senate’s] 
next session,” and it does not require the consent of the Senate.29 
A litigant before the NLRB challenged the participation of these three 
members of the Board, claiming that they were not properly appointed 
under the Recess Appointments Clause—with the result that the Board 
lacked a quorum and its decision in the specific case was a nullity.30  
Indeed, the Supreme Court had recently held that the National Labor 
Relations Act requires a quorum of three members for the Board and its 
adjudicating panels to act.31  Since the NLRB possessed only two members 
without the three recess appointees, invalidation of the recess appointments 
could bring the work of the Board to a standstill. 
In a unanimous decision in January 2013, a three-judge panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the recess 
appointments were invalid.32  In an opinion by Chief Judge David B. 
Sentelle, the Court found that these appointments were not actually made 
during a “recess,” and two of the three judges also found that the vacancies 
filled by these appointments did not “happen” during a “recess” either. 
In an elaborate opinion based on a close textual interpretation of the 
word “recess”—read against the constitutional history of the founding 
period—Chief Judge Sentelle held that Article II, Section 2, Clause 3 
authorized appointments only during the “recess” that occurred between 
congressional sessions (the “intersession” recess), and not during a “recess” 
that the Senate might take within the period of a session (an “intrasession” 
recess).33  Accordingly, the court found that the appointments were void 
because they were not made during the requisite “intersession” recess.34  
Moreover, writing for a majority of two of the three judges, Sentelle found 
that the text required that positions filled under the Recess Appointments 
                                                          
 27.  Tribe, supra note 26.  On the same day, President Obama announced he was making a 
“recess appointment” of Richard Cordray to be Director of the new Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau.  Id. 
 28.  U.S. CONST. art. II § 2, cl. 3. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 493, 498–99 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 
S. Ct. 2861 (2013). 
 31.  New Process Steel v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2638 (2010). 
 32.  Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 499. 
 33.  Id. at 505–06. 
 34.  Id. at 506–07. 
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Clause must first have become vacant during an intersession recess—a 
requisite that was also not fulfilled in this case.35 
Because the Noel Canning decision could well impose a significant 
limitation on presidential authority, the Obama Administration sought 
review of the decision in the Supreme Court of the United States, and the 
Court granted certiorari in June 2013.36  Perhaps viewing the judgment of 
the D.C. Circuit Court as having limited reach (and invoking earlier 
decisions upholding recess appointments), two of the NLRB members 
involved in the Noel Canning decision, Sharon Block and Richard Griffin, 
Jr., continued to function as Board members even after Noel Canning was 
decided by the D.C. Circuit.37  In spring and summer 2013, however, two 
additional federal courts of appeals found that President Obama’s recess 
appointments to the NLRB were unconstitutional, in opinions that did not 
differ in basic approach from the opinion of Judge Sentelle in Noel 
Canning.38 
Finally, in July 2013, a form of temporary political truce was 
achieved—rather surprisingly—when the contending political parties in the 
Senate entered into an agreement that allowed a Senate vote on President 
Obama’s NLRB candidates, as well as votes on certain other executive 
                                                          
 35.  Id. at 512.  As a corollary of these propositions, the court also concluded that, under the 
Recess Appointments Clause, “the filling up of a vacancy that happens during a recess must be 
done during the same recess in which the vacancy arose.”  Id. at 514. 
 In order to prevent recess appointments by President Obama, Republican senators had 
sought to conduct pro forma sessions during the Senate’s vacation, so that it could be argued that 
there had been no “recess.”  (Democrats had done the same thing, for the same reason, when 
George W. Bush was President; Stephenson, supra note 20, at 945 n.14).  The arguments of the 
parties in Noel Canning were focused on whether these pro forma sessions would avoid the 
application of the Recess Appointments Clause.  By the breadth of its decision in this case, 
however, the D.C. Court of Appeals superseded (or at least avoided) these narrower arguments. 
 36.  Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3702 (U.S. 
June 24, 2013) (No. 12-1281).  In addition to the questions squarely presented in Judge Sentelle’s 
opinion, the Court also asked for argument on the effect of the Senate’s pro forma sessions on the 
President’s authority under the Recess Appointment Clause. Id. 
 37.  Corey Boles and Kristina Peterson, Deal Pulls Senate from Brink, WALL ST. J., July 16, 
2013, at A1; Sam Hananel, Obama’s Labor Board Picks Face Opposition, WASH. POST (May 16, 
2013) http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-16/local/39310203_1_senate-republicans-
recess-appointments-senate-health; Peter M. Shane, The Future of Recess Appointments in Light 
of Noel Canning v. NLRB, BLOOMBERG LAW, http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-
contributions/the-future-of-recess-appointments-in-light-of-noel-canning-v-nlrb/ (last visited Sept. 
28, 2013). 
 38.  NLRB v. Enter. Leasing Co., 722 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding invalid President 
Obama’s recess appointments of NLRB Members Sharon Block, Richard Griffin Jr., and Terrence 
Flynn, because these appointments were intrasession, rather than intersession, appointments); 
NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 719 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding invalid President 
Obama’s recess appointment of NLRB Member Craig Becker, because the appointment was an 
intrasession, rather than an intersession, appointment). 
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branch nominees, including Richard Cordray.39  Cordray was immediately 
confirmed,40 but NLRB members Block and Griffin, whose nominations 
were at issue in Noel Canning, were casualties of this agreement.  President 
Obama withdrew their nominations for regular (Senate-confirmed) 
appointments, and two other members were nominated and confirmed in 
their place.41 
How do these developments affect the status of the Noel Canning 
case?  Certainly, NLRB members Block and Griffin no longer have any 
claim to office after the withdrawal of their nominations by President 
Obama and Senate confirmation of their successors, in July and August 
2013.  But the precise issue in Noel Canning—whether Block, Griffin and 
Flynn were legitimately in office (and thus whether a quorum was present) 
in February 2012 when the NLRB order was issued against Noel Canning—
does not seem to be affected by these later developments. 
Thus, it seems that Judge Sentelle’s opinion in Noel Canning still 
stands and will most likely be considered by the Supreme Court in the 
October 2013 term.42  Accordingly, it seems worthwhile to return to 
Sentelle’s opinion and reconsider it on its own terms.  Indeed I think it is 
particularly important to do this because I believe that the technique of 
Sentelle’s opinion raises fundamental problems.  I think it is very 
questionable in a case like this to employ Sentelle’s technique and base a 
decision solely on an academic parsing of the word “recess” in light of the 
founding history, especially since the court’s interpretation of the term 
“recess” may not be so clear and convincing as the panel claims.43 
                                                          
 39.  Boles & Peterson, supra note 37. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id.; The National Labor Relations Board Has Five Senate Confirmed Members, NAT’L 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-
releases/national-labor-relations-board-has-five-senate-confirmed-members. 
 42.  Of course it is always possible that the Court, in light of intervening events, might 
dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.  See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME 
COURT PRACTICE 358 (9th ed. 2007) (suggesting that the Court has sometimes dismissed a writ of 
certiorari if “a change in circumstances since the writ was granted [has] lessened the importance 
of the case”).  As this form of dismissal is entirely within the Court’s discretion, it is difficult to 
assess the likelihood of this rather unusual event. 
 43.  For a contrary interpretation of the term “recess”—to include intrasession recesses—see 
Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1224–26 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 942 (2005).  
In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the intrasession recess 
appointment of Circuit Judge William H. Pryor, Jr. by President George W. Bush.  Id. at 1227.  In 
addition to issues implicated in Noel Canning, the court in Evans also confronted—and rejected—
the argument that federal judges could not permissibly receive recess appointments (which are 
necessarily temporary) because of the requirement in Article III that federal judges shall hold 
office “during good behavior”—that is, in effect, for life.  Id. at 1223.  Earlier cases from the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Second Circuits came to the same conclusion, permitting the 
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Rather, I think that in a case of this kind, questions of principle should 
also play an important role.  The issue of principle here is that in 
considering appointments to the executive branch, inferences from the 
President’s role in the constitutional structure as head of the executive 
branch should be given a significant degree of weight—and senators’ use of 
procedural devices (which do not involve a majority vote on the merits of 
any officer) in order to frustrate the President’s choice should be found to 
possess a significantly lesser degree of legitimacy. 
Such a functional decision based on principle would of course require 
a substantially different mode of analysis than that employed by Judge 
Sentelle, and, in this brief contribution, I would like to sketch out two 
possible alternative approaches to this problem.  In any event, where the 
weight of principle falls on the President’s side in this area, and the 
teachings of text and Eighteenth Century history remain unclear, some 
alternative methods of interpretation might be considered. 
The place to start in this form of re-assessment, I think, is with an 
understanding that the decision in the Noel Canning case, and Judge 
Sentelle’s opinion, represent a pretty drastic departure from the way in 
which the issues of recess appointments have been viewed and acted upon 
over the past decades.  Indeed, the great weight of custom or practice—at 
least from the mid-twentieth century onwards—seems to be opposed to 
Judge Sentelle’s interpretation.  For example, according to the opinion in 
Evans v. Stephens,44 twelve Presidents “have made more than 285 
intrasession recess appointments of persons to offices that ordinarily require 
consent of the Senate.”45  Moreover—in contrast with the opinion of the 
two majority judges in Noel Canning—the view that a recess appointment 
may fill a vacancy that has not first occurred during a recess is a view that 
“is consistent with the understanding of most judges that have considered 
the question, written executive interpretations from as early as 1823, and 
legislative acquiescence.”46  Therefore, in light of the significant history of 
recess appointments that were considered valid in their time but would have 
been struck down under Judge Sentelle’s interpretation, we might devote 
some further thought to Justice Frankfurter’s view in the Steel Seizure Case 
                                                          
recess appointment of federal judges.  United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 708–09 (2d Cir. 
1962); United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1009–12 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 44.  387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 45.  Id. at 1226. 
 46.  Id.  Earlier federal circuit court cases adopting this position include Allocco, 305 F.2d at 
709–15 and Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1012–13. 
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that a “systematic, unbroken, executive practice” may well indicate that this 
is the way the Constitution was designed to work.47 
Of course Justice Frankfurter was certainly not a hard line originalist 
in his conception of judicial review.  Although he was famous for being 
painfully scrupulous about whether certain cases should or should not be 
decided by a court,48 Frankfurter hardly felt himself constrained by 
speculations as to the Framers’ supposed original intent in the interpretation 
of the Constitution’s substantive provisions.  The Constitution was a 
practical document and—perhaps having in mind certain similarities to the 
concept of “practical construction” in the common law doctrine of 
contracts—Frankfurter argued that the way a document, or an institution 
created by the document, actually worked in practice was ultimately an 
important criterion to follow in the document’s interpretation.  “The 
Constitution is a framework for government,” Frankfurter declared, and 
therefore “the way the framework has consistently operated fairly 
establishes that it has operated according to its true nature.”49  Justice 
Frankfurter continued: 
                                                          
 47.   Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J. 
concurring). It should be noted, however, that some judges and commentators argue that the 
President’s practice of making “intrasession” recess appointments is not sufficiently longstanding 
to qualify it as a “gloss on executive power” in Frankfurter’s view, and that few if any intrasession 
appointments occurred in the earliest periods of American history.  See, e.g., NLRB v. New Vista 
Nursing & Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 240 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[I]t has been only over the last thirty years 
that presidents began relying so heavily on [intrasession] recess appointments”).  In response, 
others maintain that the practice is of rather longer duration, and they suggest that the Presidents’ 
increasing use of intrasession recess appointments is actually a reaction to changes in the Senate’s 
pattern of intersession and intrasession recesses.  See id. at 264–65 (Greenaway, J., dissenting) 
(“Since 1947, Presidents have made nearly 400 intrasession recess appointments without 
significant rebuke or controversy. . . . The recess practices of the Senate have evolved . . . which 
has caused recess appointment practices to evolve in response.”); see also NLRB v. Enter. Leasing 
Co., 722 F.3d 609, 663–64 (4th Cir. 2013) (Diaz J., dissenting) (noting that prohibition of 
intrasession recess appointments “[would deem] invalid over 500 appointments by fourteen 
Presidents dating back to the 1860s”).  In contrast, Judge Sentelle in Noel Canning noted that the 
Supreme Court explicitly declined to defer to recent congressional practice in INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919 (1983).  Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 502 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 
S. Ct. 2861 (2013).  These contending arguments would be analyzed and evaluated in the fuller 
consideration of the applicability of Frankfurter’s views, recommended in the text. 
 48.  See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266–330 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(presenting classic defense of political question doctrine); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 498–509 
(1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (declining to decide constitutionality of unenforced statute); see 
also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 594–96 (Frankfurter, J. concurring) (carefully examining question 
of justiciability before proceeding to the merits in the Steel Seizure Case). 
 49.  Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610.  A remark somewhat earlier in Frankfurter’s Youngstown 
opinion very interestingly anticipates this connection between history and “nature”: “The 
Founders of this Nation were not imbued with the modern cynicism that the only thing that history 
teaches is that it teaches nothing.  They acted on the conviction that the experience of man sheds a 
good deal of light on his nature.” Id. at 593. 
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 Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government 
cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give 
meaning to the words of a text or supply them.  It is an 
inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law 
to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the 
gloss which life has written upon them.  In short, a systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of 
the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by 
Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, 
making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of 
our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ 
vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.50 
This view clearly resembles the doctrine of a “living Constitution”—
although not a living constitution under the management of judges.  This 
was the concept of a “living Constitution” developed by the political 
branches that were frequently required to find a practical path under 
circumstances unimagined by the Framers.  In this respect, Frankfurter 
followed the general views vividly expressed by his mentor Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, in a memorable passage in Missouri v. Holland:51 
 [W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent 
act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize 
that they have called into life a being the development of which 
could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its 
begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they 
had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their 
successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a 
nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our 
whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a 
hundred years ago.52 
Following Justice Frankfurter, we might therefore say that a long 
practice of intrasession recess appointments (as well as an even longer 
history of executive views on appointments to vacancies that originally 
occurred during a session of the Senate) authorizes us to turn away from a 
controversial inquiry into the original position of the Framers on various 
problems of recess appointments and allows us to interpret Article II, 
Section 2, Clause 3 in conformity with a history and practice that might 
show us the “true nature” of the document.  Indeed, I would argue that such 
a technique seems particularly justifiable if the history and practice thus 
                                                          
 50.  Id. at 610–11.  For quotation of much of this passage in the specific context of recess 
appointments, see Allocco, 305 F.2d at 713–14. 
 51.  252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 52.  Id. at 433. 
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invoked reinforces the important inferences from the Take Care Clause 
noted above—the view that the Constitution should be interpreted to give 
significant weight to the President’s authority to appoint those executive 
officers who, in the President’s opinion, are most fit for the purpose of 
exercising discretion under Article II and taking care that the laws are 
faithfully executed in the general manner that the President prefers. 
Finally, I would like to advance an alternative (but complementary) 
suggestion which may not have much in the way of a judicial pedigree but 
deserves, I think, serious consideration in light of the general principles of 
the separation of powers.  Under some circumstances, a particular branch of 
the government may accumulate what seems to be inordinate or excessive 
power.  This may occur through inevitable developments resulting from 
industrial or political change, such as the increased power of the President 
and the Executive arising from necessarily broad delegations of power 
under the statutes of the administrative state.  Or, in contrast, excessive (or 
disproportionate) power may accrue through specific actions of dubious 
constitutional legitimacy—such as the use of anti-majoritarian procedural 
devices by a minority of Senators to block Presidential appointments of 
executive officers, as discussed above.  When such a constitutional 
imbalance occurs, the Court should consider the possibility of 
implementing the underlying principles of the separation of powers by 
handing down decisions that redress the balance—or by upholding the 
actions of another branch that have the purpose or effect of redressing the 
balance.  Thus, if the constitutional role of one section of the government 
becomes distorted, the courts may interpret the power of another branch in a 
manner that provides an antidote.53 
The Supreme Court declined to adopt such a principle in INS v. 
Chadha54—when it struck down the institution of the legislative veto, a 
device which, under many circumstances, could be viewed as redressing 
excessive power necessarily accorded to the executive by broad legislative 
delegations of power.  I continue to believe that the Court’s decision in 
Chadha was a mistake,55 and I have viewed with considerable interest 
Congress’s persistence in continuing to insert these (now unenforceable) 
legislative veto provisions in certain statutes.56  In any case, I think that the 
                                                          
 53.  For a recent opinion in this area that focuses on the importance of preserving an 
appropriate balance between the President and the Senate, see NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & 
Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 244–70 (3d Cir. 2013) (Greenaway, J., dissenting). 
 54.  462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 55.  See Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 TEX. L. REV. 785, 832–
37 (1984). 
 56.  See LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22132, LEGISLATIVE VETOES AFTER 
CHADHA (2005). 
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principle of redress sketched above should play at least some role in the 
interpretation of the relevant constitutional language, when that language 
seems to leave many questions open.  And specifically with respect to Noel 
Canning, that principle of redress should take into account the important 
inferences from Article II, noted above, which favor a significant degree of 
advantage for the President in choosing the executive officers who will 
assist the President in taking care that the laws are faithfully executed. 
I must concede that each of these two suggested pathways toward a 
revised view of Noel Canning may involve some problems.  Nonetheless, I 
think that an opinion based on function and principle, along the lines 
discussed above, would come a lot closer than Sentelle’s textual exegesis to 
the true nature and requirements of the separation of powers. 
